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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Case No. 88-0171

v.
Karl W. Winsness,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANTS BRIEF IN RESPONSE
STATEMENT OF ISSUES IN RESPONSE TO APPELLEES BRIEF
1.

Whether Mr. Winsness, the defendant, complied with the

marshalling requirement in his challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his conviction.
2.

Whether

this

Court

should

consider

Mr.

Winsness's

objections to the sequence of jury instructions as raised on
appeal.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State relies is
included in the body of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Winsness complied with the requirement that, in his
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, he marshal the
evidence

supporting

the

jury

verdict

insufficient to support his conviction.

and

show

that

it

is

There was very little

evidence in support of the jury verdict in this case, but Mr.
Winsness did marshal that which existed, which was insufficient to
support his conviction.
This Court should consider Mr. Winsness's objections to the
sequence of jury instructions because to do so would avoid manifest

injustice.
appeal

Moreoverf constitutional issues may be considered on

even though they

have not been

raised

below

if the

appellant's personal liberty is at stake. In the case at hand, Mr.
Winsness's personal liberty is at stake, being sentenced to a term
of at least five years in prison.

Mr. Winsness's constitutional

right to due process has been deprived him because the jury
instructions were set forth in a sequence appearing to establish
that the defense-of-habitation defense was not available to him.
The effect of this sequence was not remedied by any subsequent
instructions.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT COMPLIED WITH THE "MARSHALLING"
REQUIREMENT, HIS CLAIM THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CONVICTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.
This Court stated in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817
P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991), that "the one challenging the verdict
must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict." Mr. Winsness has done this.
The only evidence presented at trial that supports the jury verdict
is, first, that Mr. Winsness shot his gun, and second, that the
sheriffs

breaking

through

his

door

shouted

simultaneous to, or shortly after, breaking in.

their

identity

This evidence—

even when marshalled and viewed in a light favorable to the jury
verdict—is insufficient to support Mr. Winsness's conviction of
attempted murder.

2

This Court stated in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah
1983) that courts cannot

"take a speculative

leap across a

remaining gap [in the evidence] in order to sustain a verdict."
Furthermore, in State v. Castonquay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah
1983), this Court "cautioned that the act in itself does not raise
the presumption that it was done with the specific intent required
to prove the offense."

In order to prove attempted murder, the

Court in Castonquay set forth two questions which "must be answered
in the affirmative":
1.
Did the defendant's conduct disclose
conscious deliberate preparation to kill...which
was
foiled
only
through
some
extraneous
interference and not through a volitional act or
omission on the part of the defendant?
2.
Did the defendant manifest, either by
voicing his conscious desire, or by divulging by
inference that this was his chosen objective...?
Id. at 1325 (emphasis added).
The facts supporting Mr. Winsness's conviction require a
speculative leap from the fact that he shot his gun to the
conclusion

that

he

intended

to kill

police

officers.

The

conviction relies upon Mr. Winsness's act raising "the presumption
that it was done with the specific intent required to prove the
offense."

Id. at 1326.

This over-reliance on the act itself is

emphasized by the absence of evidence answering the two Castonquay
questions. First, there was clearly no evidence that Mr. Winsness
did not "foil" himself through his own volitional act; i.e., by
deliberately shooting away from the center of the door.

And

second, the State did not present evidence that Mr. Winsness
3

"manifest[ed], either by voicing his conscious desire, or by
divulging by inference that [murder] was his chosen objective."
Id. at 1325.

The only evidence offered is the self-serving

testimony that the sheriffs yelled their identity either as they
broke in or shortly after they broke in to Mr. Winsness's home.
And yet even this testimony was not undisputed by the state's own
witnesses, who could not agree when or even whether there was
yelling.

See Br. of App. 9.

Viewed in a light favorable to the jury verdict, this evidence
remains insufficient.

The desire to affirm a jury verdict cannot

drive a court to sustain speculative leaps.
at 444-45.

See Petree, 659 P.2d

The State did not present evidence that Mr. Winsness

heard any identifying shouts.

Nor did the State show that Mr.

Winsness acted in a way allowing an inference that he heard any
shouts.

Therefore, for the jury to conclude that Mr. Winsness

heard and understood the sheriffs identify themselves required a
speculative leap, which should not be affirmed by this Court.

POINT II
THIS COURT CAN AND SHOULD CONSIDER MR. WINSNESS'S
APPEAL OBJECTING TO THE SEQUENCE
OF JURY
INSTRUCTIONS.
"Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be
assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice."
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c).

It has been held that if the error is

invited, then it cannot be reviewed even to avoid a manifest
injustice. State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah App. 1991).
4

However, in the case at handf Mr. Winsness appeals the sequence of
the instructions, not their content.

He did not request that the

instructions be given in the sequence they were given. Therefore,
this case does not involve an invited error, and should be
considered by this court to avoid manifest injustice.
Clearly,

a

sequence

of

instructions

that

creates

the

appearance that Mr. Winsness did not qualify for the defense-ofhabitation defense effected a manifest injustice to him.

In fact,

not only did he qualify for the defense, but he only needed to
establish a reasonable doubt that he was actually defending his
home and himself.

The instructions, however, gave the appearance

of strict criminal liability because the entrance by the sheriffs
was in fact lawful.1
In addition to Rule 19(c), this Court has the authority to
consider constitutional issues that are raised for the first time
on appeal if a person's liberty is at stake.
8080 P.2d 798 (Utah 1990).

State v. Jameson,

Mr. Winsness's liberty is clearly at

stake here, facing a possible life sentence in prison.
1

The instructions creating the unconstitutional appearance
denying Mr. Winsness of the defense-of-habitation defense are
numbers 25 and 26. Jury instruction #25 reads as follows (emphasis
added):
A person is justified in using force against another when
he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to
prevent or terminate the other's unlawful entry into or
attack upon his habitation....
Jury instruction #26 reads as follows (emphasis added):
You are instructed that the attempted entry
defendant's home by peace officers was lawful
accordance with a lawfully issued search warrant.
5

of
in

Mr, Winsness's due process rights, under both Utah and United
States constitutions have been impinged by the sequence of the jury
instructions.

According to State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah

1986)f jury instructions can affect one's due process rights.

In

that case, a jury instruction explicitly created a presumption,
relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable
doubt of every essential element of a crime.

Id. at 1370.

also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
that

such

an

instruction

was

See

This Court held

unconstitutional—despite

the

existence of other instructions that could be read to cure this
defect—because

a reasonable

juror could have understood

the

instruction to create a mandatory presumption.
In Mr. Winsness's

case, the

substance

of

instructions did not create such a presumption.

the

disputed

However, the

sequence of the instructions did, appearing to completely preempt
his use of the defense-of-habitation defense.

One instruction

seems to say that the defense of habitation statute can only be
used in the case of unlawful entries, and the next instruction says
that entry in Mr. Winsness's case was lawful.

This sequence had

the effect of creating a conclusive presumption:

Mr. Winsness

could not use the defense because the entry was lawful.

In fact,

however, the lawfulness of the entry affects only the presumption
of reasonableness.

Therefore, while Mr. Winsness did not benefit

from a presumption of reasonableness, he should have benefitted
from from a presumption of innocence. The statute was available to
him, requiring only that he raise a reasonable doubt as to his
6

intent.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Winsness has marshalled the evidence supporting the jury
verdict below and shown that—even when viewed in a light favorable
to the jury verdict-—it is insufficient to support his conviction.
The lack of evidence supporting the jury verdict provides Mr.
Winsness with very little evidence to marshal.

Perhaps this fact

is what motivated the State to argue that he had not satisfied this
requirement.

In fact, however, the State, and not Mr. Winsness,

has failed to marshal sufficient evidence. In the trial belowf Mr.
Winsness was convicted because the jury instructions gave the
appearance that he was strictly liable, and not because the State
had

adduced

sufficient

evidence

to

convince

a

jury

beyond

reasonable doubt.
For these reasons, Mr. Winsness respectfully requests this
Court to reverse his conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

^ 7

day of February, 1992.

•S33COTidh J. Chacon
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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